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Nitrogen levels in water resources in the Waikato region are increasing, mainly as a result 
of  non-point  source  pollution  from  agricultural  activities.  Non-point  pollution 
management  is  a  complex  issue  requiring  sufficient  information  and  appropriate 
institutions. This paper considers the environmental policy literature and analyse how 
institutions, contract design, and monitoring and transaction costs in the presence of farm 
heterogeneity encourage optimal abatement. The analysis identifies the key institutional 
issues to be addressed in the design of appropriate policy measures to  address water 
quality in Waikato river sub-catchment.   
 
1. Introduction 
Agricultural land use has contributed to increased levels of nitrogen in Waikato water 
bodies. Pastoral agriculture’s contribution to the degraded water quality has been well 
recognized (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2004).  Agricultural non-
point sources have largely been free from regulation to-date. There is a development of 
community pressure for better water quality in recent times (Broadnax, 2006). Besides 
supporting healthy living, water bodies contribute to aesthetic beauty, tourism and 
sporting opportunities. Lake Karapiro and Arapuni are identified as waters of national 
importance for tourism by the Ministry of Tourism. Lack of monitoring and enforcement 
are said to be of deteriorating water quality (Cullen, Hughey, & Kerr, 2006). The 
challenge is how to reduce the non-point source pollution from agriculture. Agri-
environmental policy in New Zealand has increasingly focussed on how to manage water 
quality. Bio-economic modelling focussing on abatement cost of policies plays an 
important role in the analysis of environmental policy (Ramilan & Scrimgeour, 2006). 
However appropriate institutions are important for effective policy implementation. 
Institutional factors in this text mainly refers to establishment and enforcement of 
property rights, transaction costs and instrument issues related to property rights, 
monitoring and enforcement of agri-environmental policies. High enforcement costs and 
imperfect compliance make policies less effective than desired.  
 
In the presence of well-defined property rights the majority of issues are resolved by 
markets. It is often difficult to adequately define property rights across multiple 
dimensions, however the greater economic value on resources at stake yields greater 
incentives. Adequately defined property rights are important to address the water quality 
issue.   3 
Scientific research has played a key role in providing basic data for environmental 
management and developing innovative best management practices. There is a need for 
new tools for facilitating implementation of environmental management by analysing the 
issues in designing and implementation of institutions. Therefore this article considers the 
economics, environmental and law literature on property rights, monitoring and 
enforcement of environmental policy in order to develops a conceptual framework for a 
catchment based institutional approach to address the water quality problems. Attention 
focuses on the nitrogen discharges into water, which currently receive intense attention in 
general in New Zealand and particularly in Waikato.  
 
We begin with fundamental issues associated with property rights and their present status 
in New Zealand.  The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses 
the need for an institutional change. Section 3 discusses the transaction cost. Section 4 
analyisis the importance of proxies in measuring discharges. Section 5 addresses 
monitoring and information. Section 6 outlines the way in which the conceptual frame-
work is adapted to encompass non compliance and monitoring in agri-environmental 
policy enforcement. Section 7 discusses the implications for policy and research and 
section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
1.1 Property rights, present status and prospective needs 
In economic literature property rights are defined as a bundle of entitlements defining 
owners rights privileges and limitations for use of resources (Tietenberg, 2006). (Allen & 
Lueck, 2002) defined property rights as the ability to freely exercise choices over the 
asset in question. Property rights include the law, customs and regulations governing the 
rights and obligations of individuals and firms to have access to and use the environment. 
Rights are relationship among individuals with respect to resource use. Efficient property 
rights must be exclusive that all benefits and costs accrued as a result of an activity 
should accrue to owner, transferable among individuals in a voluntary exchange; and 
enforceable. 
 
Farms often enjoy an initial allocation of property rights because it is easier for them to 
discharge nutrients rather than who wants improved water quality to control the 
discharge. Under the present property rights regime farms are not required to pay the full 
social cost of the nitrogen pollution they generate. In the absence of environmental and 
human health costs, farms have an incentive to ignore them in the decision making 
process. Ignorance of external damage cost leads farms to select management practices 
that result in greater than the socially optimal levels of nitrogen discharge. This violation 
of exclusiveness is referred to as externality. Since there is a divergence between private 
cost and social cost of the pollution created, the nitrogen discharge problem can be 
considered as a negative externality (Figure 1). MSC and  MPC refer marginal social and 
private costs respectively. 
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Figure 1: Privately and socially optimal levels of output 
 
To date, discharging nitrogen into water bodies has not been constrained, so landowners 
have effectively been exercising a perceived privilege to discharge. In the past this was 
not seen to infringe on the rights of others. The right of society to high water quality is 
now found to be in conflict with the privilege to discharge nitrogen. Non-point pollution 
control in the Waikato region largely depends on moral suasion and on voluntary 
measures such as establishment of riparian margins. Lack of implementation of other 
regulatory measures can be attributed to the perception of agriculture as a key regional 
economic activity, absence of scientific evidence on the impact of farm nitrogen 
discharges until recently and difficulties in developing efficient means of regulation. 
Existing structure of rights and obligations are unacceptable to some members of society. 
To enhance environmental outcomes, rights and obligations need to be structured such 
that they increase the net benefits. The structure chosen will impact on how wealth is 
redistributed, and therefore, the extent of social disruption. Environmental policies 
proposed seriously curtail pre existing property rights of farms to an extent that may 
threaten the viability of their operation (Hardaker, Humie, Anderson, & Lien, 2004) 
 
Environmental problems basically arise when property rights are ill defined, when rights 
are exchanged under non competitive conditions and when social and private discount 
rates diverge (Titenberg, 2006). Efficient solutions to the environmental problem can 
involve such as private negotiation, judicial remedies and regulation by the legislative 
and executive branches of government. Knowledge of property rights and their impacts 
on incentives are imperative to orchestrate a coordinated approach to resolve pollution 
problem in Waikato water bodies. 
 
Property rights institutions are especially important to enhance water quality through all 
kinds of policy instruments. Therefore there is need to define property rights adequately 
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and establish clear lines of authority to implement and enforce policies. Property rights 
evolve through common law courts, legislatures, voluntary associations and other 
governmental institutions (Anderson, 2004).  
 
If we consider a region, we may need generic and specific types of institutions to address 
the issues. Since catchments vary across many dimensions throughout the landscape and 
respond primarily local land use and water use actions,  comprehensive uniform regional 
or national rules may be inappropriate (Ruhl et al., 2003). For instance in Waikato,  the 
Waikato river catchment from the Lake Karapiro to Taupo control gates has been 
identified  as one of the water bodies in the region with its highest priorities for nutrient 
management (Brodnax, 2006). Environment Waikato has identified the establishment of 
nutrient targets for the Waikato river and tributaries between Lake Taupo control gates 
and Lake Karapiro Dam and the as a key component of future environmental policy 
development (Environment Waikato, 2005 d). Implementation of policy instruments like 
tradable permits requires a clear definable unit and trading must occur within clearly 
defined catchment boundaries. This will help to ensure that water quality improvements 
will appear. In controlling non-point source pollution in a catchment geo-physical factors 
influence the direction of nutrient flow. Part of the clear definable unit is the property 
right necessary to make use of the credit (Ruppert., 2004). Best management practices 
convey the property rights in a specific manner. Non-point source best management 
practices are thought to be a particularly cost-effective means to achieve water quality 
improvements (Stephenson, Norris, & Shabman, 1998). 
In Waikato many farmers have adopted land base effluent management system despite 
high capital cost but in the presence of slightest economic incentives in the form of 
fertilizer cost and consent application fee savings (Parminter, 1999). Rules are being 
proposed to control nitrogen discharges in terms of stocking standards and best 
management practice and the regional council is exploring the feasibility of controlling 
nutrient problem through tradable emission permits (Environment Waikato, 2005).  This 
approach privatises the right to access the resource to a pre-specified degree. This 
necessitates establishment of limits on nitrogen discharge to achieve water quality targets. 
Establishing a market for nitrogen emissions requires the establishment and allocation of 
rights to discharge. This requires all current privileges to be surrendered, and the rights to 
nitrogen emissions to be allocated  Undefined property rights and transaction costs are 
reported to be a major barriers for the smooth functioning of tradable permit markets 
among non-point sources (Collentine, 2006). 
1.2 Industry led initiatives 
Dairying is the predominant pastoral farming activity in the region reportedly 
contributing considerably to the problem of nitrogen discharges to water bodies. In order 
to be self responsible the dairy industry has undertaken some initiatives in the recent past. 
Under the dairying and clean streams accord measures are taken to exclude livestock 
from water ways and proper effluent disposal on voluntary basis.(Fonterra, MFE, & 
MFA, 2003).  To date, non-point pollution control initiatives have heavily relied on 
voluntary measures such as establishment of riparian margins.    6 
There are couple of industry led initiatives to improve the environmental performance of 
dairy farming in New Zealand. The industry has recognised the need to ensure the 
environmental sustainability and mapped out a strategy for sustainable environmental 
management (Dairy Environment Review Group, 2006). Environment Waikato along 
with Fonterra, Tatua and Dexcel, have been undertaking an education campaign about 
dairy effluent rules. Effective policy implementation requires robust mechanisms to 
estimate the performance of farms with respect to environment. 
1.3 Legislative structure for the environment  
The core of the legislation in New Zealand intended to help sustainable management of 
agricultural lands and water bodies, is the Resource Management Act (RMA) of 1991. It 
promotes the voluntary, economic and regulatory approaches to control non-point source 
pollution. The section 32 of the Resource Management Act states that the local 
authorities must consider alternatives, assess the benefits and costs of objectives, policies, 
rules and other methods. The other methods mean the provision of information, services 
or incentives levying charges including rates. The act by itself has reportedly not 
empowered the councils to use them (Denne, 2006). Clear tools for managing the 
environment have not been explicitly mentioned. Similarly under section 24, the role of 
the Minister for the Environment has been mentioned to consider and investigate the use 
of economic instruments including charges levies, other fiscal measures and incentives to 
achieve the purposes of the resource management act. No specific power has been 
provided to administer economic instruments. The amended version of section 32 
removes the explicit reference to charges and incentives, stating only that local 
government should consider the extent to which each objective is the most appropriate 
way to achieve the purpose of this act. Regional councils are given statutory 
responsibility under the RMA (sections 9 and 15) to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse 
effects on water quality in the region. In some countries best management practices are 
directly enforceable. For instance Oregon law requires the development and use of best 
management practices to protect water quality (Boyd, 2000). 
If we look into the experiences elsewhere on the issue of property rights and pollution, 
(Cole & Grossman, 2002) cited some interesting court rulings in which the defendant 
claimed a “right to pollute” groundwater partly by virtue of the fact that it had been doing 
so for a long time without penalty. The court ruled that regardless of when the polluting 
acts occurred, and regardless of society's changing views on the propriety of polluting the 
environment over the years, the defendants have never had a right to pollute the 
groundwater. We view it that overall benefits and cost of rules will be considered in 
Waikato context as dairy farming is a major economic activity and linked many other 
industries. However facilitating favourable land use changes to reduce discharges using 
public fund is viewed as victim pays regime has been criticized (Environmental Defence 
Society, 2007). This society stresses that the regulator should take the view that land 
owners are not authorized to damage the lake and do not have the presumptive rights.  
2. Is there a need for a change? 
Since the current property rights structure allows discharges of nutrients into water 
bodies, producers are not required to pay the full cost of environmental pollution caused   7 
by nutrient discharges. According to (Stiglitz, 2000) internalising the cost of pollution is 
confronted with following challenges. Firstly the dispersed nature of non point pollution 
and difficulties in measurement increases the transaction costs of internalizing externality 
through voluntary negotiations among individuals. Secondly achieving a solution through 
judicial system is difficult as individual contribution of farms to the pollution is small to 
justify costly judicial process. Further uncertainties associated with the impact of non 
point pollution results in unwarranted results through litigation process.  
 
Arguably there  is a space to redesign present structure of property rights to implement 
environmental policy(Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle, 1998). Economic and 
legal institutions are important when transaction costs are not zero and property rights are 
not well defined (Allen & Lueck, 1999). In the absence of well defined property rights, 
the regulator can play a vital role for assignment of initial entitlements (Richards, 2000). 
In the event of high transaction costs, apart from assigning values, regulator can set 
environmental quality targets, choose instruments to accomplish those goals, monitors 
compliance, and initiate actions to enforce the rules. (Gangadharan, 2000) proposed 
regulator designed programmes could facilitate the evolution of markets that encourage 
participation. In the case of externalities the state can play a significant role of defining 
and assigning property rights to enable bargaining solutions. The degree of subdivision of 
rights can improve the efficiency of transactions, because agents could contract on the 
necessary rights only (Depres & Grolleau, 2005). 
 
Given current challenges there has been increasing reliance on public remedies to 
redefine property rights. Arguably government intervention is required to regulate the 
nutrient discharge into water, either in the form of redesigning the current property rights 
structure to allow for a private market solution or in implementing policy instruments that 
will convey the desired property rights structure. Solution to the pollution problem 
through public initiative are broadly categorised into direct regulation and market based 
solutions. 
 
In New Zealand local authorities are empowered through the Resource Management Act 
to monitor resource consents, compliance and complaints. (Ruhl et al., 2003) stated the 
features of a model institutional structure for a catchment management act. This act must 
empower local agency with authority and responsibility to manage surface and ground 
water quality and quantity issues and the relavant authority must be capable of 
establishing democratically based legitimacy at regional and local levels. Further 
institutional structure must have the capacity to carry out scientific, economic and social 
analysis functions, as well as the responsibility to make policy and regulatory decisions 
through public, transparent procedures based on the record of best available evidence it 
generates through its capacity. They further stressed the need for local authorities to play 
a stronger local partnership with a shift from regulator/ advisor to facilitator/partner 
 
 3. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are defined as the cost of information gathering, contracting and enforcing 
property rights (Allen, 1991; Allen & Lueck, 1999). In case of non-point pollution transaction 
cost is mainly incurred by the regulator in order to carryout the pollution control policy. 
Transaction costs include information, contracting and enforcement costs. Information   8 
costs include the cost of targeting farms, finding the linkages between the discharges and 
farming practices. Contracting costs are the administrative and staffing cost involved in 
contracting targeted farms. Enforcement costs are costs of monitoring to audit adoption 
of nitrogen discharge measures, estimating discharge levels and  administering incentives 
The way the property rights are defined is going to have an impact on the transaction costs. In 
the presence of transaction costs assignment of property rights plays a crucial role to 
determine efficient solution. (Cole & Grossman, 2002) described the normative inference 
of Coase’s theory that that the property rights need to be assigned in a way to reduce 
transaction costs.  i. e rights need to be awarded to the party who has the higher cost of 
abating them 
 
Inclusion of transaction costs is very important for policy analysis as it lead to the design 
of policies and institutional arrangements with lower transaction costs. (McCann & 
Easter, 1999)listed the importance of transaction costs in environmental policy analysis 
as it may affect which policy alternative attains an environmental goal at least cost; 
reduce the amount of abatement that is optimal from the point of view of society and  




3.1 Components of transaction cost 
We synthesised the components of the transaction cost following (McCann & Easter, 
1999; Moxey, White, & Ozanne, 1999) and (Thompson, 1999). The magnitude of 
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T- Transaction cost  
R-  Cost of research information gathering and analysis 
E- Enactment of enabling legislation including lobbying cost 
D- Cost of design and implementation of policy 
S- Support and administration of ongoing programme 
M- Monitoring and detection 
P-Prosecution and inducement costs 
Β- Discount factor 
i- Policy 
t- Time period 
 
Monitoring costs can vary depending on entailed negotiation effort and intensity of 
monitoring effort. Intensity of monitoring can be measured as monitoring frequency. The 
primary input used is labor as represented by staff and farmer time. Fixed and variable 
costs are related to set up and continuing cost in each category. It is visible that the 
transaction costs have fixed and variable cost components for instance the monitoring 
costs are a variable cost. This is in line with the cost specification for empirical analysis   9 
by Falconer & Whiteby (1999). In policy selection abatement costs and transaction costs 
need to be considered together. (McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan, 2005) 
stated that policies must not be rejected due to high transaction costs alone since there 
may be trade off between transaction costs and other types of costs. Some policies with 
low abatement costs have high transaction costs.  
 
4. Estimates of outcomes and associated transfer costs 
Measuring, monitoring and enforcement of diffuse discharges in a physical sense are  
relatively impractical and expensive. Therefore deriving technically perfect property rules  
based on real measurement could be informationally demanding in practice, thereby  
incurring high transaction costs. Further there is a presence of time lag, for the discharged 
nitrogen from farm to reach the water. Given the non-point source information is  
imperfect and costly to obtain, there is a need to develop water quality protection proxies 
 as an interdependent surrogates for property rule formulation. This necessitates the use 
of a simulation models. This approach has been adopted in many circumstances.  
Simulated discharges are used to establish relationship between farm management 
activities and nitrogen discharges. Proxy values make environmental policies operational 
in a transparent way. 
 
The legal validity of simulated discharges is questioned (Weersink et al., 1998) based on 
the level accuracy of the estimates due to stochastic influences outside the farmers’ 
control. For instances nitrogen discharges can increase with precipitation intensity. Since 
the model results are generally not acceptable evidence, they can be challenged through 
the legal system. This leads to costly litigation. This problem can be solved by 
formulating the model based discharges in a contract framework, where one of the 
contract items  is that signatories  decline the right to challenge model results through the 
court system (Romstad, 2002). Legal action would adversely affect the use of these 
models for emission based policy enforcement purposes.  Despite the difficulties growing 
capability of environmental process models enable designing policies based on the model 
estimates of environmental impact (Romstad, 2002).  In Waikato the Overseer nutrient 
budget model developed by Agresearch has been used to simulate nitrogen 
discharges(Ledgard & Power, 2006).  
 
The use of calibrated and validated catchment specific simulation model enhances the 
transparency of the implemented environmental institutions. In order to enhance the legal 
validation, it is important to carry out monitoring and measurements in stream water 
quality as well to complement and verify the closeness of estimates to the reality. Models 
not only reduce the information problem but also help to decompose environmental 
impacts into natural and man made impacts.  
 
The challenge is even we could achieve precise model based estimates of nitrogen 
discharge, the periodic use of these complex models on a farm may be demanding 
particularly in terms of data collection and specification.  
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5. Monitoring and Information 
Successful adaptation of property rights in the form of catchment based policies depends 
on information acquisition. Catchment based approach for water quality improvement 
requires much more information about pollution sources, water quality conditions, spatial 
relationship between land use activities and pollution.  
 
Compliance monitoring is important for the effective operation of agri- environmental 
policy. Monitoring is also an important component of transaction cost and proxies are 
used to reduce the cost. Here we focus on what to monitor. The diffuse nature of nitrogen 
discharges from agricultural sources posses serious challenges in monitoring and 
enforcement of environmental policies. It is difficult to isolate individual farm 
contribution. This makes development effective monitoring strategies for individual 
farms difficult.  Regulators have little information about the contribution of individual 
farms to pollution problems.  Economists hypothesize that farmers have more 
information about their pollution discharges than regulators, and this creates a hidden 
action problem for non-point source pollution abatement. To some extent monitoring can 
be carried out by implementing visible best management practices.  
 
Since the measurement of water quality is costly in spatial and temporal domains, 
researchers have employed remote sensing techniques for water quality information 
retrieval. (Boyd, 2000) stated monitoring strategies include proposals for remote-sensing 
via satellite to determine compliance with land management and construction 
requirements, such as buffers and cover crops. In 2006, remote sensing techniques for 
lake water quality information retrieval is used (Sudheer, Chaubey, & Garg, 2006). This 
shows the phase at which technology revolves. Cost of measuring water quality in spatial 
and temporal domains will dwindle with evolving precise technologies. 
 
According to (Johansson, 2002) abatement is a function of two parameters: observable 
abatement effort and unobservable abatement effort. In our situation observable 
abatement efforts are best management practices like riparian margin, feed pad, stand 
off/winter pads, grazing off and effluent disposal systems and number of animals. 
Unobservable abatement efforts include the rate of fertilizer application and feeding 
practices. Unobservable abatement efforts lead to strategic non-compliance because of 
information asymmetry. Non point source can mislead the regulator by reporting and 
adopting different levels of unobservable abatement efforts. The problem of hidden 
information arises because monitoring does not detect all those who fail to comply with 
contractual obligations. This provides polluter with an incentive by escaping policy 
regulations or penalties.  
 
As a monitoring indicator for environmental policy  animal density is increasingly being 
used  as a standard for nutrient management policies (Ribaudo et al., 2003). The strength 
of using animal density as a regulatory standard lies in its ability to provide a 
straightforward, relatively easy to calculate indicator of farm’s nutrient balancing 
potential. The concept of using animal density as an indicator of nutrient balancing 
potential is fairly transparent, it needs certain assumptions  about feeding practices and 
fertilizer applied need to be considered. For instance feeding practices can have dramatic 
effect on the nitrogen discharges. But in case of nitrogen discharges potential animal   11 
characters can have a variability and tracking the number of animals can be a problem 
problematic.  
 
5. 1 Contract design 
Contracts between the regulator and polluter are an enforcement vehicle for 
environmental policies. The contract is signed between the regulator and the polluter. The 
contract may specify the input levels and best management practices to manage the 
discharge levels. In non- point discharges based on proxies information asymmetry exists 
because an environment agency does not possess perfect information regarding the 
technological profile and conduct of polluters who are subject to agri-environmental 
policy.  The informational advantage that farmers enjoy in their relationship with the 
regulator can be two forms: one is ex -ante and other is expost. When signing a contract 
to reduce the use of input levels, the polluter always has an incentive to declare inflated 
input use levels. This enables the farmer to enjoy the same input use after signing the 
contract. After signing the contract there is an incentive to renege on their contracts, for if 
they can be successful in avoiding detection by the regulator. The challenge is to devise 
policies that function effectively in the presence of information asymmetry.  
 
We propose the above the first problem can be tackled by assigning discharge reduction 
levels based on appropriate composite index of input levels and output-input ratios. Here 
it is assumed that the regulator can observe the output levels. The polluter with lower 
ratios can be allocated larger percent of discharge reductions. Higher ratios can be 
allocated with lower percent of discharge reductions. This method is some how closer to 
the concept of greater abatement where the marginal abatement cost is lower. The 
following section on conceptual model for monitoring describes the model for 
information asymmetry. 
 
6. Conceptual model  
This section develops a conceptual model for monitoring of a farm subject to agri-
environmental policy that requires an income forgoing action on the farm. In addition the 
regulator used a monitoring and penalty scheme to discourage information asymmetry. 
We assume the regulatory authority wants polluters to reduce the nitrogen discharges. 
Consequently they receive reduced levels of returns.  
 
The pollution problem can be framed in the context of pastoral farm and regulator, who 
represents the society. Farm production can be denoted as a function of input use. 
Consider a catchment where nitrogen discharge is generated from farming activity. Farms 
in the catchment are heterogeneous in terms of production structure and pollution 
potential. Causes for the heterogeneity are soil type, land slope, distance from the main 
stem of the river etc. Heterogeneity of farm is denoted by i,  Θ ∈ i  General specification 
of the production function for Yield per ha for a farm is 
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i i x y y =             (1) 
This function is assumed to be a twice differentiable and concave in inputs use, xn.  
 
Pollution discharge from the farm depends on the farm heterogeneity and input use.   12 
) ( n
i i x z z =              (2) 
This function is assumed to be twice differentiable and convex in inputs use, xn. 
 
 
The regulator has limited knowledge about the polluters’ production and pollution 
function. In the absence of contractual arrangements between farms and regulator, farms 
always tend to choose the input levels to maximise the profit  
Suppose input is used by price –taking, profit maximizing farms and output price is py 
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*  this optimal input use vary according to the farm heterogeneity. 
 
We assume the regulator wants farmers to reduce their nitrogen discharge through a 
combination of adoption of best management practices and input use restriction. 
Regulatory contract is assumed to be mandatory. As a result of restricted levels of input 
and adoption best management practices 
Ri
n x they receive restricted profit
i
R
* π . The 
abatement cost, C, is defined as the difference between the unrestricted maximum level 
of profit 
i *
0 π  and the restricted level of profit
i
R







0 π π − =             (4) 
 
We assume the environmental agency wants to maximize the following function.  
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m (p) stands for monitoring cost of the regulator. The regulators monitoring costs depend 
on the degree of monitoring effort undertaken i.e.  to a large extent on the frequency of 
visits and effort put into scrutinizing farmers’ activities. It is assumed that monitoring 
costs, m are function of p i.e. m(p), where  
0 ) (
' ≥ p m and  0 ) (
' ' ≥ p m  
 
 
Therefore in designing contracts regulator must ensure that farmer compliance is secured 
despite there being imperfect monitoring. 
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Alternatively if the agent wants to renege the agreement, the income is assumed to be  
 
v v I π =  If not caught          (7) 
) 1 ( δ π − = v v I caught          (8) 
 
v π can be equal or less than the unregulated profit 
i *




* π .  δ is a penalty parameter. 
 
 
Specifying the probability of detection is p, the expected income from violating the 
agreement is  
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The degree of violation depends on the relative merits of   It and E ( Iv ) 
 
 
Targeting the farms based on the heterogeneity reportedly increases the information 
efficiency  while lessen the data collection effort (Farzin & Kaplan, 2004). On this 
premise we seek to explore the implications of different types of monitoring on the cost 
of monitoring and non compliances by adapting the scheme proposed by (Fraser, 2004) to 
reduce moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes. In selective monitoring sub group of 
farms with a higher potential of nitrogen discharges are targeted, implying their 
probability of being monitored is higher than participants outside the group.  
 
 
What the regulator wants is minimization of the discharge violation at a lower cost of 
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Resource neutral targeting 
Overall monitoring resources are unchanged with the introduction of targeting, and so an 
increase in the probability of detection in one zone and reduction in other zone. Higher 
probability pH of detection is achieved in the target zone by shifting monitoring resources 
away from those in the non target group, where the probability of detection is pL. Under 
this scheme expected income from violating in the target group.  H L p p p < <  
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Under non target group expected income from violation is  
)) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( δ π π − + − = v l v l Non v p p I E       (14) 
 
 
Even though it minimizes the violation in the target group. It may encourage those 
previously not violating in the non target group to violate as the relative merits of 
violating is on the rise. The proportion of agents violate depends on degree of difference 
in the income out of true behaviour and violation 
  
Non-resource neutral targeting 
In this case regulator devote additional resources for monitoring to target activities in 
order to maintain the probability of detection  in the non target group at the level 
prevailing prior to the introduction of targeting 
pL = p. In this case the proportion of farms violating, in the catchment will come down 
but will not be eliminated totally, because the farms in the non target group still has 
incentive to violate. Further regulator has to dedicate more resources in monitoring. This 
will increase the m (p), Therefore the choice of degree of targeting depends on the trade 
off between the minimisation of violations and cost of monitoring.  To what level 
nitrogen is to be abated depends on a trade-off emerges between the social benefits 
nitrogen abatement  and the cost of nitrogen abatement and the costs incurred from the 
need  to undertake higher levels of monitoring  to secure it  
 
Resource neutral targeting with weighted penalties 
Under this scheme adjustments are done in the monitoring and penalty parameters of the 
non target group. Purpose of this approach is eliminating violation completely without 
either using more resources on monitoring and increasing the perception among non-
target group farmers of the expected penalty δ associated with violation. Increased 
probability of detection in the target group is resourced by a decreased probability of 
detection in the non target group. Anyhow the expected cost of violation in the non target 
group is kept constant by applying new penalty parameter  T δ  for non targeted group. 
That is for non targeted group. 
 
)) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( T v l v l v v p p p p δ π π δ π π − + − = − + −     (15) 
 
However monitoring schemes themselves can never be perfect, information asymmetry 
remains a potential source of weakness. We may think of minimising the degree of 
violation by increasing the penalty to a higher level.  In fact by raising the penalty, the 
regulator can lower the probability and thus the cost of monitoring close to zero. 
However, in the case of agri-environmental policy, this usually does not reflect judicial 
reality (Ozanne, 2001). Therefore penalties need to be fixed at a relatively low level.  
 
Geographic delineation of target farms in the catchment is technically possible according 
to their pollution potential based on soil physical parameters, but the political feasibility   15 
of differentiated penalties is a contentious issue. On the other hand it may be feasible to 
enforce geographically differentiated compensation plus penalty schemes for the forgone 
production losses. This issue needs to be considered in assigning property rights.  
Reduction in cost of monitoring could be achieved through technical enhancement of 
monitoring (Choe & Fraser, 1999). Compliance monitoring can be complemented 
through technological subsidies in terms of extended extension services. This minimises 
non compliance due to lack of information and skills.  
 
7. Implications for policy and research 
The major causes of nitrogen discharge from farms are stocking rate, nitrogen fertilizer 
application and supplementary feeding. The degree of the nitrogen discharges can be 
reduced to a certain extent by adopting best management practices. The rest of the 
reduction is needed to come from management of nitrogen fertilizer, stocking rate and 
supplementary feeding. We can reasonably assume that the farmers have no incentive to 
violate the best management guidelines on timing of input applications. However 
polluting agricultural inputs like fertilizer and supplementary feeding are difficult to 
monitor. The problem of this violation can be tackled by setting incentives associated 
with milksolids. This approach shifts the monitoring burden to outputs that in many 
instances are readily observerable. Assessing producers’ response to input changes 
requires empirical knowledge of the production function. (Peterson & Boisvert, 2004) 
showed that monitoring corn yields could be substituted for the potentially costly and 
intrusive monitoring of fertilizer use. In the Netherlands nutrient discharges from crop 
farming are estimated using nutrient accounting system. Nutrient budgets derived from 
self reporting. Apart from self reporting, information is sourced from off farm sources. 
Feed and fertilizer suppliers are required to supply farm wise sales details to the 
regulator. This approach is feasible in New Zealand 
 
(Bontems, Rotillon, & Turpin, 2005) used the relationship between the pollution and 
production of a particular farm type to design incentive based environmental policy. The 
programme requires farmers to report the estimated pollution as well as the production. In 
our case there is an involvement of two difficult to observe inputs and the  input- output 
relationship is complex as inputs are transformed into final product through  multiple 
transformations within the farming system. Therefore devising methods which enable 
output based monitoring in the catchment with minimum information needs an empirical 
exploration. Output based monitoring the production can be minimised if regulator 
cooperates with the industry passing on the benefits to the industry. 
 
Environmental impact of the nitrogen discharge depends on the location of the production 
activities because of spatial variation in soil type, land slope and hydrological flows. The 
variability in potential emissions and contamination risks can vary within relatively small 
geographic regions (Schou & Birr-Pedersen, 2001). Good environmental policy need to 
be based on the insights of robust science.  Geographic information system is used in 
provide the information needed to design spatial policy environmental policy 
interventions(Cook & Norman, 1996; Horst, 2005). Informational requirements on farm 
boundaries, stocking rate, pattern of production and pollution feature can be established 
using geographic information system. Geographic information based spatial tools can be   16 
used to define the most suitable or relavant geographical target areas for the policy 
intervention. All farms in the catchment need to be represented in Geographical 
Information System on internet, including data on land use, number of dairy cows, 
fertilizer application and adoption of best management practices. milksolids production. 
Since most farmers have internet access this approach enhances the transparency and 
reduces the transaction cost of overall regulatory procedure.  
 
Choosing effective and efficient environmental policy involves consideration of ability to 
achieve the goal, cost effectiveness, lower transaction costs, enforceability and 
information demand, dynamic incentives for further research and development of 
technologies, equitable distribution of cost and benefits and political feasibility. Further 
unawareness of the cause and effect relationship between the farming activities and the 
resultant nitrogen discharges also can contribute to the problem (Weersink et al., 1998).  
 
In a trade off in the presence of budgetary constraints, a greater intensity of data 
collection and thus dedicating fewer resources for sediment load abatement, results in 
greater reductions in uncertainty and sediment loading (Kaplan, Howitt, & Farzin, 2003) 
This suggests that diverting some resources from abatement effort to information 
acquisition or monitoring may improves the overall abatement effectiveness 
 
 
Nitrogen discharge impacts have two aspects: difficulties in observing individual 
emissions and stochastic damage. This paper assumes discharges are deterministic. In 
most circumstances, the discharge levels and consequent damages caused by discharges 
depend on stochastic environmental factors. Particularly variability in rainfall over time 
can have profound effect on discharges as well as consequent pollution transport. Farm 
specific technical parameters are not fully known to the regulator, but a reasonable 
amount of information can be elicited from available farm survey data and geographic 
information systems.  
 
8. Conclusions  
Innovative institutions can both improve outcomes and reduce the transaction cost. 
Development of scientifically and legally defensible data collection procedures and 
catchment modelling are key steps. Institutional structure must rely on more than 
voluntary governance and voluntary compliance. There is a need to empower full range 
of market based and regulatory compliance mechanisms.  
 
Despite the policy consideration of institutional change, it is important to know 
politicians will place considerable emphasis on distributional issues and any analysis  
should carefully consider distributional issues. There is need to extend sufficient 
extension services to maintain the nutrient budgets. The evolution of property rights is 
driven by an ongoing search for ways to internalise externalities. Institutional 
arrangements need to evolve to empower people to take abatement measures for nitrogen 
discharges. The diversity of risk preferences should not be ignored in designing 
environmental policy. 
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